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1. Introduction and methodological considerations 
 
The objective of this report is to analyze alternative developments in Central America and the 
Caribbean for the period 2017-2027. The analysis should consider both regional and global 
intra-state relations (focusing on the US, EU, China, India and Russia), in terms of political, 
economic, military and social issues. The domestic political development will be analyzed 
taking into account possible conflicts that each of the global powers could be involved in, 
strategic natural resources as well as colonial relations. 
 
First of all, it is, as often, quite complicated to define the regions to be included in the report. 
Delimitations of regions can be done based on a range of different factors, for example 
geographical, geopolitical, cultural, ethnic, or linguistic. 
 
This report will use the extended definition of Central America, including Belize, Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.
2
 The most important reason for 
this is that the regional cooperation schemes that are developing to an increasing degree 
include all these seven countries. 
 
In the case of the Caribbean it is more complex. In general, here, it will include the Caribbean 
islands and Suriname and Guyana located on the South American mainland. The main reason 
for including Suriname and Guyana is that they are members of CARICOM.
3
 The Dutch 
Caribbean includes Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles and Sint Maarten. The French Caribbean 
includes French Guyana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, St Martin and St Barthelemy. The British 
Caribbean includes Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat 
and Turks & Caicos Islands. These islands are still administratively dependent of the Dutch, 
French and British state, respectively. Seven of the eastern islands, all former British colonies, 
have formed the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia and St Vincent & Grenadines (7 countries) – 
all members of the CARICOM. The Eastern Caribbean States have developed a high degree 
of formalized cooperation in security issues (www.caricom.org). 
                                           
1
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Another delimitation that is used, for example in some US-endorsed programs, is the 
Caribbean Basin, which then includes all countries with a Caribbean coastline (El Salvador 
added). However, that definition is too broad for the purpose of this report. 
 
The supposed conflicts are analyzed according to the following actors, structures and causes. 
The analysis of conflicts are based on a multidimensional perspective where the security 
concept goes beyond its military meaning to encompass economic, social, cultural, political 
and political aspects.
4
 The analysis will follow an explanatory model framework that was 
developed in Follér and Stenman (2006)
5
, which will serve as a basis to develop different 
future scenarios. The model does of course not cover all the factors that could possibly affect 
future conflict patterns, but based on our own experience and the literature survey, we have 
chosen to focus on the variables that are most probable to have a decisive impact on future 
developments. The variable to be explained is future conflicts and security risks, and the 
explanatory variables are the following: i) external relations, ii) regionalization – strategies of 
integration, iii) inequality – distributional policies, iv) democratization – institutions, v) 
democratization – civil society, vi) organized crime, vii) militarization – methods of conflict 
resolution (see also appendix 4). 
 
2. Theoretical remarks 
 
The point of departure is that every society has long-term trends, at the economic, social, 
political and demographic level and that the world situation has a certain influence on how 
these trends develop. How a region, a country, a community or local actors handle a conflict 
situation depends on the definition of these conflicts; on their origin, nature and consequences 
as well as on how they are appreciated by the above mentioned actors. The origins of a 
conflict can be multiple and can be traced to socio-economic, political, cultural, ethnic and/or 
religious causes. They can also have their origin in natural or health catastrophes that provoke 
unrest and even stigmatization of certain groups, events which can lead to migration waves or 
uprisings in extreme cases resulting in the overthrow of governments or even the collapse of 
states.  
 
As mentioned above, the security concept used in this study is multidimensional. This is 
especially important in a context where structural inequalities and hierarchies are strong and 
the culture of rights is weak and often contested by traditionally authoritarian institutions like 
the police and the military. In many of the countries in Central America and the Caribbean, 
the military has also had a completely different role and power in society compared to its 
original or traditional role of defending borders. 
 
In the debate on security, security-related issues and transnational threats, the concept of 
securitization is becoming widespread. According to Acharya (2005) “securitization is an act 
through which policy-makers label (a “speech act”) certain non-military dangers which are 
seen as posing an existential threat to the survival or well being of states” (Ibid p. 4). Others 
have pointed out that securitization also implies that the usual „rules of the game‟ can be 
offset and that emergency measures are allowed (Roe 2004:281). In the US-Latin American 
debate several issues are becoming securitized, for example drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS and 
migration (Barry 2005, Rojas Aravena 2004, Zellen 2006). However, many analysts have also 
pointed to the risk of securitizing. Such risks could be that militarized measures to combat 
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symptoms are being prioritized before other measures to overcome the underlying causes 
thereby achieving a more sustainable conflict resolution (Acharya 2005, Fourie 2006, Roe 
2004, Barry 2005:19-20). 
 
Even though regional integration or the analysis of regional organizations is not the main 
objective of this report, it is important, both for theoretical and empirical reasons, to briefly 
discuss the current processes of regional integration as well as its potential role. Björn Hettne 
and other researchers connected to peace and development studies at Göteborg University 
have published studies
6
 where they emphasize the importance of a multidimensional 
perspective on security, conflicts and development, as well as the potential positive role that 
regionalism could play in promoting peace and democratization (the concept of new 
regionalism). Many researchers have also seen the Esquipulas process
7
 and the subsequent 
formation of SICA (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana) as, at least initially, a good 
example of new regionalism.
8
 
 
3. Historical background 
 
In a similar report from last year (Follér and Stenman 2006), covering all Latin America, a 
brief historical background was included. Drawing on that, this report will only point out 
some important factors, as well as emphasizing some characteristics that distinguish Central 
America and the Caribbean from the rest of the Latin American countries. One important 
factor that differs Latin America from Africa or Asia, and affects the patterns and origin of 
conflicts is the position of the indigenous peoples. When independence was gained in the 19
th
 
century it was the Creole elite that led the struggle and formed the new national governments. 
The indigenous population continued to be deprived of their rights and their livelihoods were 
even more threatened by the economic liberalization reforms in the late 19
th
 century. In the 
Caribbean the indigenous peoples had become almost extinct before the 19
th
 century. In the 
Southeastern islands there were still some indigenous communities of Carib origin in the 20
th
 
century. The slave trade is another factor that has deeply affected the Latin American 
continent, resulting in a large share of population with African descendent. In the regions 
focused upon in this report, this is especially true for the Caribbean parts of the Central 
American countries, as well as the Caribbean region (Knippers Black 1998:59-90). For 
example in Nicaragua, this, combined with other factors, has led to the formation of an 
autonomous region in the southern part of the Atlantic coast (RAAS).
9
 
 
The Caribbean countries did not gain independence at the same time as the Central American 
countries. Most of the smaller islands achieved independence as late as after 1960 and as 
mentioned earlier; some islands still belong to the US, Great Britain, France or the 
Netherlands. However, several of the larger islands gained independence earlier. Haiti became 
independent from France in 1804 after repeated rebellions by slaves (Widfeldt 2001:212-213). 
The Dominican Republic finally formed an independent state in 1865 after conflicts with 
Haiti and struggle with Spain. In Cuba the struggle for independence started in the late 19
th
 
century. However, as a result of the Spanish-US war over Cuba in 1898, the island became a 
US protectorate. Political independence was achieved in 1933 after a military revolt 
(Knippers Black 1998:415-416).   
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Thus, in Central America and the Caribbean, the independence process also implied severe 
conflicts, and even wars, both between competing Creole elites (ex Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Honduras) and between the colonial powers including the neo-colonial power of 
the United States, the latter primarily in the Caribbean, as mentioned above. With the Monroe 
doctrine, 1823, the United States, clearly stated, directed to the European colonial powers, 
their intention to become a hegemonic power in the Western Hemisphere. The Roosevelt 
corollary from 1904 complements the Monroe doctrine, but directs itself more towards the 
new national governments or regimes than to the old colonial powers. The Roosevelt 
corollary was used to justify US interventions in Cuba (1906-1910), Nicaragua (1909-1911, 
1912-1925, 1926-1933), Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924). It was 
officially abolished in 1928, but its spirit has lived on when justifying more recent US 
interventions (Ibid p. 274-279). In terms of interventions, there is also a significant difference 
between Central America and the Caribbean compared to South America, where the former 
have been subject to substantially more interventions from the United States. Due to several 
reasons, some of them described above, the formation of nation states in Central America and 
the Caribbean has also been more fragile (perhaps excluding Costa Rica and post-
revolutionary Cuba) compared to most other countries in Latin America. 
 
Other processes that have had an important impact on the pattern of conflict and security in 
Central America and the Caribbean are the Cuban revolution 1959, the Sandinista revolution 
in Nicaragua 1979 and the wars in El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980´s. The causes of 
these conflicts are discussed in other parts of this report, as well as its consequences and the 
external interventions. Many of the relations between military groups and the drug trafficking 
organizations were established during this conflictive period of little territorial control and 
large financial needs
10
. Because of the restricted extent of this study it is not possible to go 
into the details of these processes. 
 
Concluding this brief section it would be important to point out some of the most important 
characteristics of the Central American and Caribbean countries, compared to most other 
Latin American countries. First, the proximity to the US affects all sectors of society as well 
as intra-state relations. The region includes several of the poorest Latin American countries: 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. The state apparatus is, in most countries, less 
institutionalized and more politicized, than in many other Latin American countries. Central 
America and the Caribbean were one of the most conflictive areas before the Cold war ended 
(ex Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada)
11. The conflicts that escalated during the 1980‟s 
have left a negative legacy in terms of violence (militarization, death squads etc) but also 
positive experiences of regional cooperation and dialogue (for example the Contadora group 
or the Esquipulas process
12
).  
 
Despite the many large and obvious differences between Central America and the Caribbean 
they share certain important characteristics and concerns for the future. Both regions are small 
compared to the rest of the continent, in terms of population, area, economies and markets. 
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They are a buffer or transport zone between the South and the North, both in terms of 
geopolitics and trafficking. They are comparatively poor countries where large shares of the 
population are forced to choose the exit option, i.e. migration in order to survive or assure 
improved livelihoods for themselves and their families. Due to widespread poverty and 
geographical characteristics they are also comparatively more vulnerable to environmental 
degradation, natural disasters and climate changes. 
 
4. External relations and regionalization 
 
The most important external actor for Central America and the Caribbean today is the United 
States. For many countries in the Caribbean, the former European colonial powers (Great 
Britain, France, the Netherlands) are still important. In the case of Central America some of 
the Asian countries (mainly Korea and Taiwan) are also becoming increasingly important due 
to their economic investments. The EU is becoming an important partner in trade, cooperation 
and politics. In the Caribbean, an increasing regionalization trend can be observed, but also an 
increased dependence of the US, compared to former European colonial powers. As long as 
the position of the United States as the only global power stays intact, it will remain the most 
powerful actor or counterpart for the countries in Central America and the Caribbean, 
compared to other countries, or group of countries, outside the Western Hemisphere, due to 
historical, geopolitical and economic reasons. If the position, policies and/or power of the 
United States would drastically change there is a much more uncertain future scenario.
13
   
 
In terms of multilateral or international actors, the UN, international financial institutions and 
the Catholic Church (that could also be defined as a domestic actor, where the Pentecostal 
churches also exert certain influence but not comparable to the Catholic one in terms of 
individual actors) could all have a significant influence in the countries of this region. In the 
Caribbean context, Haiti and especially Cuba are focal points for regional as well as more 
global or hemispheric tensions. 
 
The case of Cuba, and in some sense Nicaragua during the Sandinista government (1979-
1990, 2007- ), differs from most of the other countries in Central America and the Caribbean 
in terms of external relations as well as political development (not discussed here). Both the 
Cuban and the Sandinista revolution took place in the context of the Cold War. However, 
while the Cuban was almost the first of its kind in the Americas, the Sandinistas had Cuba as 
a role model and support. Both movements were initially primarily a national liberation 
movement without major support from the Socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union did not have neither ideological nor political reasons to support these revolutionary 
movements. However, due to the power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, 
strategic and geopolitical interests led to a negative polarization in relation to both Cuba and 
Nicaragua. In terms of external relations, it is interesting to see how Cuba, despite the 
dependence of the Soviet Union in other areas, during long periods maintained an 
independent position in foreign policy, sometimes causing conflicts with the Soviet Union 
(Maydanik 1995). Both Cuba and Nicaragua have also had strong interests to maintain good 
and close relations to the major European countries (Freres 2002). Cuba is still one of the 
most controversial issues among the American states, and it is also a question where many 
different Latin American governments have defended Cuba‟s right to self-determination 
against the US blockade. A possible future US military intervention of Cuba could have 
serious negative consequences for the security and stability in Latin America since it is 
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probable that several other Latin American countries would not passively accept such an 
intervention. The case of Haiti is different in this sense. The US-led intervention of Haiti in 
2004 received critique from the CARICOM as well as from many other countries but there 
were never any risk that other countries in the region would take measures to try to counteract 
the intervention.   
 
Many researchers have analyzed and theorized about the security development after the Cold 
War, among them Buzan and Waever (2003). They have analyzed how global security 
patterns have changed before, during and after the Cold War in different regions of the world 
and developed a theoretical model of regional security (Regional Security Complex Theory, 
RSCT), which is used both for area studies and for building predictive scenarios. The authors 
define a regional security complex: “a group of states or other entities must possess a degree 
of security interdependence sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to 
differentiate them from surrounding security regions” (Ibid p. 47-48).14 In the case of Central 
America and the Caribbean, Buzan and Waever argue that they form part of the North 
American RSC, with Central America (Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica 
and Panama) as a sub complex (Ibid p. 263-267). They also emphasize that, since the North 
American RSC contains the only existing superpower, the US will be significantly more 
important to the individual member countries than the four great powers, compared to other 
RSC. It is interesting to see that the authors, in terms of future predictions, do not foresee any 
large changes in the borders of the two American security complexes (the North and the 
South). However, they do signal a possible expansion or overlay into the Andean region of 
the North American RSC due to the interventions against drug trafficking (Ibid p. 269). With 
the exception of the above-mentioned shift, the authors express doubt that it would exist any 
tendency to develop one single American security complex, despite the OAS and a possible 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Ibid p. 451-29). 
  
In relation to the post cold war period, the authors mention several developments that have 
affected the inter-state relations in this RSC. In the case of Central America, one is the end of 
the armed conflicts and the reduction of US military support to the national governments. 
Another is the increasing transnational security threat from drug trafficking and organized 
crime and finally, the control of the Panama Canal, which was handed over from the US to 
Panama in January 2000. However, the canal continues to be an issue of concern for the US 
who fear that other great powers could negatively affect their own access to this important 
transport route (Ibid p. 288-289). Alternatives to the Panama Canal have been a concern both 
historically and in the present, primarily in Nicaragua and in Mexico (the Tehuantepec 
Isthmus). Nicaragua is currently planning to start building a canal with financial support from 
Venezuela, within the ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas) cooperation 
scheme (www.albalatinoamericana.org). In the case of the Caribbean, Buzan and Waever 
(2003) focus on two core issues: Cuba and transnational security issues (trafficking, money 
laundering, illegal migration and HIV/AIDS). Haiti is also pointed out as a special concern for 
the US, mainly related to illegal migration (Ibid p. 290-291). 
 
When the Bush administration sought support for their planned invasion of Iraq in 2003 they 
got very little support in Latin America. In the Security Council, Mexico and Chile voted 
against the US proposal and when the invasion finally took place it was only Nicaragua, El 
                                           
14 In relation to their RSCT, Buzan and Waever also define the post-Cold War security pattern as a 
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(Ibid p. 36-39, 445-7). 
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Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras that sent military troops to Iraq, and El 
Salvador is the only country that have not taken home their troops yet (Barry 2005, 
www.wikipedia.org 07/08/21). By some analysts, the US promotion of the ex-president of El 
Salvador as the new chairman of the OAS in 2005 was a response for El Salvador‟s support to 
the US in the Iraqi issue. However, the Salvadoran candidate did not stand a chance against 
the Mexican and Chilean candidates. 
 
There is a certain rivalry, dating back to the colonial period and the Monroe doctrine, between 
the US and the European Union (EU), and then especially the former colonial powers Great 
Britain, France and Spain. Due to the colonial ties, several Caribbean countries have had 
preferential treatment agreements with the European Union, as part of the ACP (Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific) countries. Cuba has observer status in the ACP but has been trying 
to be included as full member. The rivalry shows itself primarily in economic and political 
interests. At the moment the EU has association agreements with the MERCOSUR countries 
and with Mexico (Freres 2002). They are also currently negotiating a similar agreement with 
Central America.  
 
In terms of the relations to other great powers, like China, Russia and India, the future 
importance of especially the two latter for Central America and the Caribbean seem limited. It 
was only the power struggle of the Cold War that convinced the Soviet Union to engage in 
more extended cooperation with some Latin American countries. Today, Russia has much 
more important interests in other regions of the world and is not likely to want to challenge 
the US in the Western Hemisphere. However, China, and other Asian countries (for example 
Korea and Taiwan) do have an interest, primarily economic, to expand in Central America 
and the Caribbean. 
 
There have been some border conflicts between the Central American and Caribbean 
countries; for example between Guatemala and Belize; Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua 
(in different constellations); and Nicaragua and Colombia. Some of them have escalated, but 
only one has developed into full-fledged armed conflict in the last decades: the so-called 
soccer war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 (Knippers Black 1998:363-364). Part 
of this border dispute were later resolved in 1993 in the International Court in Hague, which 
established borders in the disputed rural area as well as over two disputed islands in the Gulf 
of Fonseca (www.wikipedia.org). However, at the moment, there is an escalation of the 
border conflict between Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua over the Gulf of Fonseca. 
Honduras is claiming maritime territory to improve their passage to the Pacific, and is 
planning to take the case to the International Court in Hague. The conflict in the Gulf involves 
both strategic (the passage to the Pacific) and economic interests that are, among others, 
related to European business interests in view of the association agreement currently being 
negotiated between the EU and the Central American countries. Especially El Salvador has 
been developing a dynamic business project in the area of the Gulf, including the cultivation 
of shrimps and carbon production (involving Spanish companies). However, there are also 
other potential conflicts in the Gulf area, linked to the environmental effects of the emerging 
industrial production and conflicts over land titles involving lands that were given to former 
guerilla soldiers after the peace accords in El Salvador in 1992, as well as speculations over 
possible off-shore oil reserves.
15
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In terms of regional cooperation, there are three organizations that currently are the most 
important for Central America and the Caribbean: the OAS (Organization of the American 
States), SICA (Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana) and CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community). Parallel to these, there are several other projects or processes of regional 
integration and/or cooperation which are sometimes overlapping or complementing the 
former three. Some of them are the economic integration processes related to the free trade 
agreements between countries in the region and the United States and the EU, respectively. 
The currently most debated is CAFTA-DR, the free trade agreement that includes the United 
States, the Dominican Republic and five Central American countries. There is also the 
opposing project of ALBA including for example Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia and Nicaragua. 
 
However, at the official, hemispheric level, the OAS is still the most important organization, 
which was also confirmed at the Special Conference on Security in Mexico 2003 where the 
participating states approved the Declaration of Security in the Americas, which recognizes 
and formalizes a number of instruments to promote dialogue and resolve conflicts in the 
Western Hemisphere, for example the TIAR (Interamerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), 
the Inter-American Commission on the Control of Drug Abuse and the Inter-American Anti-
Terrorist Committee (Rojas Aravena 2004:8). 
  
SICA was founded 1991 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with the objective to create an 
institutional framework for the process of regional integration in Central America.
16
 Current 
member states are Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Panama. The total population of the member states is around 46,6 million people 
(www.sica.int/miembros/sica/). The Dominican Republic, with 8,8 million people (PNUD 
2006:298) is an associate member while Spain, Mexico and Taiwan have observer status 
(www.sica.int). SICA was formed as a result of the regional peace process, which culminated 
in the Esquipulas II accord in 1987. This integration project was characterized, to a large 
extent, by the ideas embodied in the concept of new regionalism
17
 and by the principles that 
guided the Esquipulas process; comprehensive regionally based solutions achieved through 
dialogue and negotiations (Bull 1999:961-962). Benedicte Bull has analyzed the development 
of the regional integration process in Central America during the 1990‟s and concludes that 
the process has undergone some important changes. The regional project has increasingly 
been over-shadowed by hemispheric projects like FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) 
or CAFTA-DR. The discourse has also shifted from focus on peace, democracy and 
development in the region to focus more on how to integrate Central America to the global 
market economy (Ibid p. 967-8). This would probably indicate a loss of momentum, in terms 
of the opportunities opened by the peace and democratization processes as well as the turn 
towards new regionalism. 
 
CARICOM (The Caribbean Community) was founded in 1973, based on an older free trade 
agreement, CARIFTA, from 1968. Today, it comprises 15 member states: Belize, Bahamas, 
Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & 
Grenadines, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago and Montserrat. The total 
population amounts to approximately 17 million people.
18
 There are five associated members: 
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Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Turks & Caicos Islands (these 
are part of the so called British Overseas Territory, earlier called British Dependent Territory). 
CARICOM was initially dominated by former British colonies but have now come to include 
other countries, where Suriname (1995) and Haiti (2002) might be the most important new 
members (www.caricom.org). The expansion of CARICOM has been seen as important by 
many analysts in order to break with colonial patterns and promote a more locally based 
regionalism (ex Widfeldt 2001). CARICOM has been active in supporting a peaceful 
resolution of the conflicts in Haiti and opposed the US-led intervention of Haiti in 2004 
leading to the resignation and exile of President Aristide on February 29 
(www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/haitindex.htm). The future development of the 
CARICOM will probably depend on how the individual countries prioritize cooperation 
among the Caribbean countries, how the organization succeed in combining the different 
backgrounds and interests of the member states and how they can develop cooperation with 
other Latin American organizations (for example SICA or MERCOSUR).    
  
5. Domestic developments 
 
This part of the report will focus on the variables more closely related to internal factors like 
the socioeconomic development, democratization, organized crime and the role of the military 
(for the model, see appendix 4). In appendix 3, the results of a risk analysis of the countries in 
Central America and the Caribbean are summarized. The analysis takes into account risks 
associated to both individuals and business investments. Those risk ratings can be compared 
with the country records of corruption, democracy, violence and crime that are discussed 
further on in this chapter. 
 
The different actors or stakeholders in the domestic or internal arena could be grouped based 
on different criteria or perspectives: social groups (where the middle class is often assumed to 
have a decisive role, especially in periods of crisis), sectors (the state, the economy, civil 
society) etc. Here, the focus will not be on a single perspective but rather trying to pinpoint 
what is believed to be the decisive actors in different situations and processes that could affect 
future patterns of conflict and insecurity. Even though the states in Central America and the 
Caribbean are much less institutionalized (with some exceptions, for example Costa Rica and 
Cuba) and more politicized, compared to the rest of Latin America, they are going to be 
among the most important actors in the future, also because there might arise conflicts about 
the legitimate power of the state. Other domestic stakeholders that probably will play an 
important role are the economic elite, political parties, the military, organized crime/drug 
cartels, social movements and the Catholic Church (mainly in social issues). 
 
Socioeconomic development and inequality  
 
Central America and the Caribbean contain some of the poorest countries in Latin America. 
The states are in general much more fragile compared to the South American countries and 
due to their geographical position they are the frontier between the North and the South of the 
Americas. This has and will continue to affect the socioeconomic development in these 
countries. But, there are large disparities within the region. While GDP per capita is more 
than 10 000 USD in Barbados or Bahamas, it is about 4 000 USD in Costa Rica and Panama, 
and around 1 000 USD in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guyana. In Haiti it is only 420 USD. 
Income inequality is high. The richest 20 percent of the population receives about 60 percent 
of the income in Haiti, Guatemala and Panama. The same share in Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
is around 50 percent. In Sweden it is 37 percent. Several of the Caribbean countries lie closer 
 10 
to 40 percent (www.undp.org, see appendix 2). The most important factor behind these 
patterns of poverty and inequality is the unequal distribution of resources and incomes whose 
origins is to be found in the colonization and the establishment of the economic, political and 
social system of plantations during the 19
th
 century (de Ferranti et al 2004, Knippers Black 
1998:351-379). It was these inequalities and the lack of democracy that sparked the armed 
conflicts in Central America in the 1970‟s and the 1980‟s as well as the revolution in Cuba in 
1959 (Knippers Black 1998:351-379, 413-423). As long as these structures of poverty and 
inequality do not change, they will continue to be a source of insecurity and conflict. 
 
The emerging HIV/AIDS epidemic is very slowly receiving more attention by the 
governments in the region. The most affected areas so far are the Atlantic coast of Central 
America and the Caribbean countries. In 2005, AIDS was the leading cause of death among 
adults aged 15-44 and the Caribbean is defined as the second-most affected region in the 
world. The UNAIDS has had problems with governments in the region that are reluctant to 
publicly discuss the extent of the epidemic and possible measures. Access to treatment is 
generally low in the most affected (and poorest) countries (www.unaids.org). In several 
Central American countries, international as well as national NGO‟s are launching awareness 
raising campaigns on HIV/AIDS. Unfortunately, these campaigns are often met with 
resistance from dominant conservative sectors within public authorities and the Churches 
when it comes to policy measures including information and education on sexuality and 
reproductive health.  
 
This lack of socioeconomic development, including high unemployment, has led to large 
migratory flows, which have increased during the 1990‟s. The most important destination is 
the US. According to US census data there are over 15 million foreign born Latin Americans 
in the US, 2 million of them are Central Americans. However, these data are probably 
underestimated due to illegal immigration. For example, official US data shows that the 
number of Salvadorans in the US is around 800 000, while analysts estimate that there are 
close to 2 million. The Diasporas send remittances back home to their families, which have 
developed into a major income and an important factor of macroeconomic stability for many 
countries in Central America and the Caribbean. In 2002, migrant remittances in El Salvador 
and the Dominican Republic represented 17 and 10 percent of GDP and 65 and 37 percent of 
exports, respectively. Remittances per capita amount to 440 USD in Panama, 361 USD in El 
Salvador and 257 USD in the Dominican Republic. The majority of the remittances are used 
cover expenses for basic needs. The migration and the development of large Diasporas in a 
relative close geographical distance have also implied an increase of economic and 
commercial relations between the two countries, in the form of telephone communications, 
nostalgic trade, tourism and as a direct consequence of the remittances, financial transactions 
(Orozco 2004). The migration has, in these different forms, had important positive effects on 
the economies of the source countries. However, several analysts are also critical towards a 
too positive view on the effects of migration stating that it is important to take into account 
the social costs of migration, the risk implied for many persons who migrate illegally and that 
migration is usually not a first-hand choice but a last resort due to unemployment and poverty 
(see for example Renzi 2004:132-134).  
 
Democratization: Institutions and civil society  
 
Most countries in Central America and the Caribbean have a weak tradition of democracy and 
in some cases, a short record of democratic elections. Costa Rica is the exception where, due 
to specific factors in the historical context, a stronger state and a more democratic society 
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have evolved. During the last decades, as the authoritarian regimes have become fewer and 
democratic elections more common, civil society organization have grown stronger, but the 
institutional framework is still weak and fragile in most countries. In some countries, where 
violent conflicts have characterized the societies during long periods, the military and the 
police have still a strong position of formal or informal power. In the 1980´s, in the context of 
the high level of conflicts in the region, there were also a negative development where drug 
trafficking organizations increasingly cooperated or bribed state authorities, including the 
military and the police, in order to use Central American and Caribbean territory, as a transit 
area for the smuggling of narcotics to the US. This development has been especially serious in 
countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica 
(United Nations 2007, Peacock and Beltrán 2003). Below, some indicators will illustrate the 
level of corruption in some of the countries in Central America and the Caribbean, as well as 
the perceived levels of freedom.  
 
The international NGO Transparency International publishes an indicator of the degree of 
corruption (corruption perception index – CPI). The CPI measures the degree of corruption 
perceived by business people and analysts. In the 2006 survey, several of the countries in 
Central America and the Caribbean, receives very low (negative) scores. Haiti has, by far, the 
worst record, followed by a group of countries that still score very bad: Honduras, Guyana, 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Grenada, Cuba, and Belize (www.transparency.org/policy-
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006). 
 
Another international NGO, Freedom House, has developed an aggregated index of freedom, 
based on two indicators of the level of political rights and civil liberties, respectively. The 
countries are divided into the categories of free, partly free and not free. The only country in 
Central America and the Caribbean that is defined as not free, by Freedom House, is Cuba. 
Five countries are defined as partly free: Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guyana. 
The rest of the countries are defined as free but Trinidad & Tobago receives a low score on 
political rights while Jamaica and El Salvador receive low scores on civil liberties 
(www.freedomhouse.org, 2007 edition). 
 
Organized crime and violence  
 
It is important to take into account both the record of democratization and the socioeconomic 
development in the analysis of organized crime. The reports from the Truth Commissions, 
and similar reports, in both El Salvador and Guatemala have clearly shown the links between 
the military regimes, paramilitary groups, impunity, corruption and organized crime and drug 
trafficking in Central America.
19
 
 
In the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
20
 for 2007 several Central American 
and Caribbean countries are defined as major (Guatemala, Panama, Bahamas, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti and Jamaica) or significant (Costa Rica and Nicaragua) transit countries for 
drugs. Several of these are also pointed out as countries where there exist major money 
laundering of incomes from drug trafficking: Panama, Guatemala, Dominican Republic and 
Haiti. The report is also warning about the possibility of increasing money laundering in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. The assassination of three Salvadoran members of the Central 
American Parliament in Guatemala on February 19, 2007 and the subsequent assassination of 
                                           
19
 See for example United Nations 2007, Loveman 2006, Peacock and Beltrán 2003, CDHES 1993. 
20 Published by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US State Department. 
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the policemen arrested for murdering the parliamentarians highlighted the issue of drug 
trafficking and related corruption in Central America and especially Guatemala. These events 
draw attention to widespread corruption, drug trafficking and the transnational networks of 
international criminal organizations, both Mexican and Colombian drug cartels were 
mentioned in relation to the events in Guatemala described above.
21
  
 
Another transnational, or transnationalized, phenomenon that is mentioned by many actors 
and/or policymakers in the region is the maras, pandillas or youth gangs operating mainly in 
urban areas. These urban gangs were even mentioned as a threat to US national security by 
the commander of the US Southern Command in 2004 (Loveman 2006:xxii). Bruneau (2005), 
makes important reflections on how the maras constitute a more serious threat in countries 
like El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, compared to for example Los Angeles, due to the 
fragile status of democracy in the former countries, as well as the unclear role of the military 
in the post-conflict setting. The author also analyses why the maras should be considered a 
serious threat to national security in the Central American countries. He mentions five factors: 
i) the government (including the police and legal system) has not been able to counteract the 
rapid increase of violence and gang-related crimes; ii) a culture of democracy has still not 
developed in these societies; iii) in some areas, the maras have already become substitutes for 
the official authorities, iv) the maras are diversifying their activities into entrepreneur, using 
violence to compete against other firms active in the same sector or area, v) the maras have 
begun to develop strategies to integrate into official structures (like the police) or non-
governmental organizations maintaining their use of violent methods (Ibid p.5-6). Following 
this, Bruneau analyses in what ways the maras could constitute a threat for US national 
security. The level of violence due to the maras are, in many countries, a too heavy burden for 
the police and the government might be forced to use the military instead, or as a 
complement. This has been the case in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The 
mobilization of the military against the maras might constitute a threat to the democratization 
process due to the factors mentioned above. There is an obvious risk that the transnational 
character of the maras will increasingly involve them in the trafficking of people, arms and 
drugs.  However, the author emphasize that he has not found any evidence at all linking the 
maras to international terrorism and despite the risks mentioned, Bruneau concludes that he 
does not find any strong argument to consider the maras a threat to U.S. national security 
(Ibid p.8-9). The author very clearly defines the maras as a criminal problem, preferably 
countered by human and technical intelligence bodies of the state (Ibid p. 10). The social and 
possible geo-political dimensions of the growth and persistence of the maras is not 
emphasized and rarely explored.  
 
One method of measuring the widespread violence in societies is the estimated mortality rate 
from homicide, which is done for example by the Pan-American Health Organization 
(www.paho.org). In the Central American and Caribbean regions, El Salvador is, by far, the 
country with the highest homicide rate. Considerably lower rates, but still high, are found in 
Guatemala, Belize, St Lucia, Haiti and Bahamas. In the statistics on the number of homicides 
in big cities in Latin America, the capitals of El Salvador and Guatemala are usually found 
among the top five together with the Colombian cities of Medellín and Calí, or the Brazilian 
cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.  
 
Militarization and resolution of conflicts  
 
                                           
21 See for example articles in Prensa Libre (www.prensalibre.com), Diario Colatino (www.diariocolatino.com) 
and Revista Contralínea (www.contralinea.com.mx). 
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Several factors increase the probability of a higher degree of militarization of the societies in 
the region. For example; the history of military interventions in political and social issues, by 
both national and external armies; the increased securitization of problems related to 
migration and drug trafficking; and the change in US policies after the events on September 
11, 2001. There is a risk that these factors are mutually reinforcing and developing in a 
negative way in the societies in Central America and the Caribbean that are also characterized 
by very weak or incomplete democratic systems. Barry (2005) is for example pointing out a 
clear risk that US policy after 9/11, encouraging the building of “national security states”, 
contributes to a backlash where the armies in the region once again assume tasks of ensuring 
political and economic stability (Ibid p. 20). The US government is also financing a regional 
security cooperation project, including from the beginning five Central American countries, to 
build a regional rapid response task force against terrorism, drug trafficking and youth gangs 
(Ibid p. 20). Another development that has aroused preoccupation and protests from many 
civil society organizations is the establishment of an International Law Enforcement 
Academy (ILEA), based in El Salvador. One critique, or fear, is that ILEA has close ties to 
the infamous School of the Americas (now named Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation) that trained many officials responsible for abuse of human rights during the 
military regimes in the 1970‟s and the 1980‟s (www.lasolidarity.org/ilea.shtml). There are 
also recent signals that the legislation against terrorism is used to penalize and/or criminalize 
social protests, for example in El Salvador in July 2007 (Human Rights Watch, 
www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/07/31). 
 
Environmental stress or degradation 
 
The possible future impacts of climate changes should be an important factor and could, in 
many ways, alternate the security conditions in the future. Environmental changes could 
affect domestic and regional security by threatening the livelihoods of people, increasing 
conflicts due to socio-economic crises and causing migratory flows towards other countries in 
the region, for example the United States.  
 
The 2007 report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007)
22
, 
predicts that by the year 2022 the inter-tropical glaciers in Latin America “are very likely to 
disappear, affecting water availability and hydropower generation” (Ibid p. 4). They also 
conclude that the amount of people “experiencing water stress due to climate change” could 
affect as many as 77 million people in Latin America by 2020 (Ibid p. 4). The predicted sea 
level rise is foreseen to have severe negative impacts on low-lying coast, for example Belize, 
Costa Rica, Guyana, Panama and El Salvador, which are also the most vulnerable to climate 
variability and extreme events such as rainstorms and hurricanes. Flooding and erosion will 
negatively affect people, resources and economic activities in these areas. As for the impact 
on the Caribbean islands, the IPCC classify them as especially vulnerable due to the 
combination of factors. Their size and elevation make them more vulnerable, which are 
increased by their dependence on for example coastal tourism and agriculture (IPCC 2007).
23
 
 
One example of recent positive initiatives of regional cooperation in this area is the agreement 
signed by Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, in July 2007, to create the Caribbean 
Biological Corridor with the objective to protect the environment and promote human 
development in that region (www.ipsnews.net/news.asp).  
 
                                           
22
 Press Releases April 2007 – Climate Change Hits Hard on Latin America and the Caribbean. 
23 IPCC-The Regional Impacts of Climate Change, Chapter 9.4: Small Island States. 
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6. Potential future scenarios 2017-2027 
 
To elaborate scenarios about potential future trends of conflict patterns and security risks in 
Central America and the Caribbean, the report has used the model presented in the 
introduction and its explanatory variables that have been discussed in chapter 4 and 5 (see 
also appendix 4). The objective has been to try to crystallize the most important and decisive 
factors for the future development of these two regions as well as analyzing the historical and 
contemporary social, political and economic context.
24
  
 
The normative assumptions made in the following discussion are based on the earlier 
analysis: that diversified external relations would be more rewarding for the regions than US 
hegemony, a more equal distribution of resources and incomes would positively affect both 
human security and socio-economic development, a deepened democratization of the societies 
would improve the legitimacy and efficiency of state authorities and make it easier to combat 
organized crime. These are by no means controversial assumptions and can easily be found in 
international reports and well-known academic research. However, to implement policies to 
fulfill the goals linked to these assumptions require substantial political will and long-term 
commitment from many actors, not least the national governments.       
 
Worst Case Scenario: Conflicts, insecurity, interventions and marginalization 
 
 US political and economic hegemony increases, regional cooperation schemes, like 
SICA and CARICOM, have lost most of their importance since priority has been 
given to asymmetric free trade agreements similar to DR-CAFTA and the building of 
FTAA. Some of the Caribbean countries have decided to maintain their administrative 
links to former European former powers (United Kingdom, France and Netherlands). 
 The Millennium Developments Goals were never fulfilled by 2015, and most 
governments have not given priority to distributional policies. Poverty has increased in 
many countries due to increased unemployment caused by the asymmetric free trade 
agreements and the lack of adequate policy measures. The increased use of maize for 
ethanol production (exported to the US and Europe as fuel) has had a crowding out 
effect on the production of maize for food, contributing to recurrent regional famines, 
for example in Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua. The escalating AIDS epidemic, 
partly due to the lack of preventive and counteracting policy measures, has implied 
severe pressure on the states and the societies to deal with the infected as well as the 
large quantity of orphans. 
 The democratization processes in Central America and the Caribbean stagnated and in 
some countries there are only sporadic elections. The state is minimal and with little 
control over territory in countries like Haiti and Guatemala. Socio-political 
mobilizations of civil society is usually met with repressions, the political party 
systems have lost most of their democratic content. Guerrilla groups and/or self-
defense groups are becoming more and more common. There are also strong separatist 
movements based on indigenous and/or ethnic minorities with the objective to 
establish autonomous regions primarily in the Atlantic coast areas in Central America 
and in the Mayan highlands in Guatemala (with links to the Zapatista movement in 
Chiapas, Mexico). 
 Due to the economic and social problems it is easy for organized crime organizations 
to recruit primarily young men to their activities. The lack of democratization and the 
                                           
24
 Due to the limited extent of this report it has only been possible to very briefly discuss these issues. 
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subsequent degradation of the state in most countries in the regions have facilitated the 
building or strengthening of parallel powers or in some cases, simply immersing 
organized crime structures with the state bureaucracy. 
 As a result of the militarized war on drugs and the anti-terrorist legislation being 
wrongly applied to social mobilizations of civil society, the societies has become more 
and more militarized, and some countries are now ruled by military regime instead of 
civilian, elected governments. There are sometimes clashes between national military 
groups and anti-drug units of the US military. There are unresolved armed border 
conflicts related to the Gulf of Fonseca as well as the transatlantic canals in Panama 
and Nicaragua (where the canal was finally ready in 2020). 
 Due to the failure of democracy and weakened states few measures have been taken to 
counteract or prevent the deteriorating environment. Unsustainable use of land due to 
poverty and unregulated exploitation is rapidly contributing to an explosive ecological 
crisis. 
 After the death of Fidel Castro in Cuba there were no larger changes in politics. This 
led to frustration among the extremist Cuban Diasporas in the US and they finally 
convinced the US government to intervene with military forces in 2017. The 
intervention successfully installed a new regime but social and political protests are 
widespread and guerilla activities are increasing. This development has had a strong 
destabilizing effect in the whole Central American and Caribbean region. 
 The unstable political and economic development in the region has effectively 
hindered all concerted efforts to counteract climatic changes and environmental 
degradation. There is a mounting environmental crisis that affects the livelihoods of all 
people, but especially the poor. The soil, water resources and fishing conditions are 
continuously deteriorating. 
 
Best Case Scenario: Regionalism, democratization and reduced poverty 
 
 Regional cooperation schemes were given priority before projects like FTAA. 
Regionally based strategies to diversify external relations and economic dependence 
have been elaborated and implemented by most of the governments in the region. The 
US has, although critical, accepted this development but strives to maintain the 
influence primarily in certain countries like Honduras, Panama and Haiti. Other Latin 
American countries, like Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela have been important partners 
in the diversification strategy. 
 Most governments in the region made an effort to fulfill the Millennium Development 
Goals by 2015, which also succeeded in most of the countries, except some of the 
poorest, like Haiti, Guyana and Honduras. Priority has been given to policy measures 
that create employment and support a diversified supply (domestic production and 
imports from different neighboring and other countries) of agricultural products to 
ensure food security to reasonable prices. 
 The rapid increase of the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been stalled, it is still spreading but 
at a lower pace, and most governments in the region are active in national and regional 
efforts to contain the epidemic. Brazil, South Africa and the UN have been important 
partners in the struggle against the epidemic. The Catholic Church has revalued their 
earlier resistance to the use of condoms as one measure to contain the epidemic.  
 After an intensification of the democratization processes, beginning in 2010, in 
Central America and several of the Caribbean countries, most countries have been 
able to establish reasonably efficient and transparent state authorities which have had a 
positive effect on the fight against organized crime as well as the democratization of 
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society. Healthy and diversified party system has developed and there is a close 
dialogue between the civil society, the political parties and the state. This was 
achieved through several regional initiatives backed by a key group of governments 
with a strong political will to advance the democratization in the region. International 
support was also received from primarily the UN. Some countries have advanced 
more, and in some other countries the democratization process is still fragile and 
incomplete (for example Haiti and Guatemala). 
 Organized crime has decreased and is more efficiently controlled due to the successful 
reforms of the state and national security organs and through close regional 
cooperation. The social base for criminal organization has slowly decreased due to the 
improvements in socioeconomic conditions. Trafficking of humans for sexual 
exploitation has been almost eradicated while there are still problems, primarily in the 
maritime border areas, with drug trafficking from the Andean region to the US. 
 The earlier trend of criminalizing social protest in the name of the war against 
terrorism was stopped during the regional democratization process. The military and 
the police have been reformed to stop corruption and human rights abuses. The 
reforms have included education, capacity-building and wage increases. The 
confidence of the public in these authorities has increased with the reform process and 
the end of impunity for military and police officials. Especially in countries like 
Guatemala and Haiti, large quantities of officials were replaced in order to establish 
trustworthy and professional institutions. 
 When Fidel Castro died in Cuba, the government launched a concerted regional and 
global diplomatic offensive to improve the relations with the US. After some years 
regular negotiations were implemented and in 2020 the US blockade against Cuba was 
lifted. To achieve this Cuba implemented some limited political reforms in order to 
amplify political rights and civil liberties according to United Nations 
recommendations. 
 The Central American and Caribbean Diaspora in the US have improved their legal 
rights due to changes in US immigration policies and have in decisive ways 
contributed to a more positive economic development in their home countries, for 
example through community-based development and investment programs. 
 Regional cooperation has increased to deal with environmental degradation and 
climatic changes. Important policy measures have included the establishment of 
natural reserves, local sustainable development zones and improved regulations on the 
exploitation of natural resources. 
 
Mixed Case Scenario: Dependency, low intensity democracies, reduced poverty 
 
 Hemispheric economic cooperation has gained priority over broad-based regional 
cooperation. Regional organizations have lost in importance and organs like the OAS 
and the FTAA dominate the dialogue and the negotiations. In terms of economic 
cooperation US hegemony has increased at the cost of foreign investments from Asia 
and the EU.  
 The FTAA project has led to a certain industrialization (both traditional and modern 
technology) of some countries in the region, for example Costa Rica, El Salvador, the 
Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Panama. But, domestic production and employment 
in the agricultural sector have decreased, mainly due to asymmetric free trade 
agreements, causing migratory flows and social unrest. Climatic changes have caused 
severe problems for the earlier prosperous tourist sector, especially in the Caribbean 
countries and Costa Rica. Poverty has decreased but not to the level of the Millennium 
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Development Goals and income inequality continues to be high. It is primarily the 
middle class that has been able to benefit from the economic development. 
 In relation to the FTAA, most countries in Central America and the Caribbean have 
been able to reach preferential migration agreements with the US, opening up 
migration quotas as well as improving the legal status of migrants already residing in 
the US. Some countries have, for different reasons, not been able to strike such deals, 
for example Haiti (due to the conflict level) and Cuba. 
 The democratization processes have not been given priority and so called electoral 
democracies reign in most of the countries. Armed confrontations occur periodically 
between militant social movements and the military and the police. In election periods 
there are sporadic negotiations between some sectors of civil society and the political 
parties. 
 Organized crime has achieved influence in several state administrations and can easily 
mobilize mainly young men among the poor sectors of society. Bilateral agreements 
have led to that several US authorities (for example DEA and special units of the 
Southern Command) can operate freely against drug trafficking in many of the Central 
American and Caribbean countries. There are frequent social and political protests 
from civil society organizations against these operations and the establishment of US 
military bases and/or offices on Central American or Caribbean territory. 
 After the death of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the political content of the public policies did 
not change much. This caused frustration in the extremist Cuban Diasporas in the US 
who mobilized and funded guerilla groups that started activities in Cuba after 2019. 
The guerilla groups have had problems in establishing themselves in Cuban territory 
but are causing conflicts and insecurity as well as extremely tense relations between 
the Cuban and the US government. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to analyze future alternative developments in Central America 
and the Caribbean with respect to conflict patterns and security risks. This has been done 
considering the domestic developments, regional cooperation and external relations of the 
respective countries. The relations to the United States, the EU, China, Russia and India were 
of special interest. 
 
The countries in Central America and the Caribbean have had different historical experiences, 
but they share certain important characteristics and challenges regarding unequal 
socioeconomic structures, lack of democracy and a culture of rights, the proximity to the US 
and a legacy of violent confrontations as well as a disadvantaged integration to the world 
economy and to world politics. Due to different colonial and neo-colonial experiences the 
countries show differences in their patterns of external relations. Assuming that the US is still 
the only global super power, they will continue to be, by far, the most important external 
factor for the countries in Central America and the Caribbean. This might, in some Caribbean 
countries, be counterweighted by former European colonial powers like France or Great 
Britain. The future role of the EU in Central America and the Caribbean will, to a large 
extent, be dependent on US policies and what strategies of political and economic integration 
the countries in the region will choose to adopt. China and some other Asian countries do 
seem to have a clear interest, primarily economic, to expand in the Central American and 
Caribbean countries. 
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The problems facing these countries with respect to conflicts and security risks is a 
combination of internal and external factors. Their lack of social, economic and political 
stability may affect to the surrounding countries in the region. However, in the absence of a 
cold-war climate it is not likely that such effects should be far-reaching. On the other hand, a 
possible consolidation of stability may, in the long term, have positive effects in the rest of 
Latin America. The countries in Central America and the Caribbean do not, and will probably 
not, constitute a threat to the surrounding world. Most of the security threats will be local, 
national or regional problems. However, some of the effects of conflicts, insecurity, poverty 
and inequality might have a spillover effect to countries outside Latin America, in the form of 
migratory flows and trafficking of drugs, weapons or humans. This is especially the case of 
the United States, and is one of the reasons behind the trend of securitization of traditionally 
non-security related issues. As we have seen in the report, this can be both positive (for 
example increased funding) and negative (militarized measures to combat symptoms instead 
of other measures to remove the underlying causes). 
 
That is why it is important to ask, in relation to the purpose of the study: what kind of 
conflicts and security for whom? The report has discussed ample evidence of how most 
countries in Central America and the Caribbean have serious problems with widespread 
poverty, unjustifiable socioeconomic inequalities and large deficiencies in virtually all 
democratic aspects. This reality has a direct impact on the emergence of conflicts and security 
risks (both in the conventional sense and in relation to a more multidimensional perspective of 
security). There have been substantial improvements but also backlashes and deceptions. 
 
Two factors that are different in character, to those discussed above, but interacting with the 
other in social, political and economic processes, are the environmental threats and the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Both are long-wave events that cannot be stalled quickly, but decisive 
policy measures need to be implemented. If not, these two factors will have severe negative 
impacts on the future of the peoples in Central America and the Caribbean. 
 
In geographical terms, it has been possible to distinguish differences in the level of future 
risks in the different countries, in relation to socio-economic development, conflicts and 
security. It seems that Haiti and Guatemala are among the worst-off countries in this period, 
while countries like Costa Rica and the Eastern Caribbean States are comparatively better off. 
Countries like Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Guyana, Suriname, Bahamas and 
the Dominican Republic also establish themselves as clear high-risk countries. 
 
The idea of the scenario building has been two-fold; to think of concrete alternatives in a 
specific period in the future and to try to visualize how a worst-case or best-case scenario 
could develop.  
 
One of the most important conclusions is that two factors are crucial in order to determine 
future conflicts and security threats: democracy, in all its aspects, and socioeconomic 
development. This is, in some sense, not controversial at all, but the experience in Central 
America and the Caribbean have shown that it is a very complex process to advance along 
that path and that it requires a lot of political will from many different actors in the society as 
well as from international actors. The potential future scenarios that have been elaborated in 
this report clearly show that a wide variety of options are available, and most of them can to a 
large extent be chosen and developed through social, political and economic actions. 
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Appendix 1: Acronyms 
 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 
 
CACM Central American Common Market 
 
CAFTA  Central American Free Trade Area 
 
CAN  Andean Common Market  
 
CARICOM  The Caribbean Community and Common Market 
 
CARIFTA  The Caribbean Free Trade Association 
 
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South 
 
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
  
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area 
 
OAS Organization of the American States 
 
PPP  Plan Puebla Panamá  
 
SICA   Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana 
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Appendix 2: Some selected indicators  
 
HDI Country GDP  GDP Income Gini Public Public 
Rank   per capita per capita Distribution coeff. Exp. Exp. 
    USD % growth 20%   Health Education 
    2004 1990-2004 richest   % of GDP % of GDP 
  High:             
31 Barbados 10401 nd nd nd 4,8 7,3 
48 Costa Rica 4349 2,5 54,8 49,9 5,8 4,9 
50 Cuba nd nd nd nd nd nd 
52 Bahamas 16728 0,2 nd nd 3,0 nd 
57 Trinidad & Tobago 9640 3,3 45,9 40,3 1,5 4,3 
58 Panama 4325 2,2 60,3 56,4 5,0 3,9 
59 Antigua & Barbuda 10794 1,5 nd nd 3,2 3,8 
  Medium:             
68 Dominica 3794 1,4 nd nd 4,5 nd 
71 St Lucia 4663 0,4 nd nd 3,4 nd 
85 Grenada 4135 3,1 nd nd 4,9 5,2 
88 St Vincent & Grenadines 3412 1,6 nd nd 4,1 11,1 
89 Suriname 2484 nd nd nd 3,6 nd 
94 Dominican Republic 2130 4,2 56,8 51,7 2,3 nd 
95 Belize 3870 2,6 nd nd 2,2 5,1 
101 El Salvador 2340 1,8 55,9 52,4 3,7 2,8 
103 Guyana 1047 1,5 nd nd 4,0 5,5 
104 Jamaica 3352 -0,1 46,0 37,9 2,7 4,9 
112 Nicaragua 847 0,1 49,3 43,1 3,7 3,1 
117 Honduras 1046 0,2 58,3 53,8 4,0 nd 
118 Guatemala 2233 1,3 59,5 55,1 2,1 nd 
  Low:             
154 Haiti 420 -2,2 63,4 59,2 2,9 nd 
  Comparison:             
5 Suecia 38525 1,8 36,6 25,0 8,0 7,0 
8 USA 39883 1,9 45,8 40,8 6,8 5,9 
  Latin America   1,1         
  Medium HDI countries   2,9         
Source: Human Development Report 2006 (www.undp.org) 
HDI (human development indicator) is based on life expectancy, literacy rate, gross enrollment rate and GDP per 
capita. 
nd=no data available
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Appendix 3: Risk analysis of Central American and Caribbean countries 
 
Ranking Current Overall Risk (May 2007) 
Very high Haiti 
High Cuba 
  Nicaragua 
Significant Guyana 
  Honduras 
  Suriname 
  Guatemala 
Medium Jamaica 
  El Salvador 
  Dominican Republic 
  Grenada 
Moderate Belize 
  Panama 
  Dominica 
  Trinidad and Tobago 
  Antigua and Barbuda 
  Costa Rica 
  Martinique 
  St Vincent and the Grenadines 
  French Guyana 
Low St Kitts and Nevis 
  St Lucia 
  Netherlands Antilles 
  Barbados 
Neglible Aruba 
  Bermuda 
  Bahamas 
  Anguilla 
  Cayman Islands 
Medium Latin America and the Caribbean 
Source: Global Insight 
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Appendix 4: A sketch of the explanatory model (Central America & Caribbean) 
               
Security & = External + Regionalization/ + Inequality/ + Democratization + Democratization + Organized  + Militarization/ 
Future  Relations  Strategies of  Distributional  Institutions  Civil Society  Crime  Methods of 
Conflicts     Integration  policy           Conflict Resolution 
               
a) worst case  a) US   a) globalization,  a) minimal  a) "electoral  a) confrontation,  a) organized crime  a) conflicts are  
scenario -   hegemonic,  integration  policy  democracy",  conflict  widespread and  resolved by 
Increases  interventionist, based solely on  measures  institutional    transnational,  force/coercion 
the risk for  weak external  market economy    framework     parallel power   
conflicts  relations with  principles,    cracking down    with equal   
  others  assymetry and        strength as   
    imbalances         the state   
    increase           
               
b) best case  b) US non-  b) regional  b) active  b) participative  b) active policy  b) organized crime  b) conflicts are 
scenario -   hegemonic,  integration  policy for  democracy,  to improve  succesfully  resolved by  
decreases  wide range of  from below,  more equal  institutional   social and  hindered through  dialogue and 
the risk for  relations with  objective to  distribution  framework  civil rights,  reform and  negotiations 
conflicts  others  balance    strengthened  active dialogue  cooperation   
    assymetries and           
    decrease socio-           
    economic           
    differences           
               
c) mixed               
scenario               
  
